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1-5; JOHN DOE INCORPORATED 1-5, (fictitious 
designations)  
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Argued September 11, 2018 
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O P I N I O N 
   
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
  Ana Lidia Alpizar-Fallas brought a class action claim 
against Progressive Garden State Insurance Company 
(“Progressive”) and one of its agents, Bryan Barbosa, alleging 
that Progressive and Barbosa’s deceptive business practices 
violated New Jersey’s Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”).  The 
District Court dismissed her claim, characterizing it as a 
denial of insurance benefits, which the New Jersey appellate 
courts have ruled is not covered by the CFA.  Because we 
view Alpizar-Fallas’s complaint as alleging deception that 
would be covered by the CFA rather than a denial of benefits, 




This case began with an all too common occurrence: a 
car accident.  Frank Favero’s car struck that of Alpizar-Fallas, 
causing Alpizar-Fallas “serious injuries and damages,” 
including substantial pain and suffering, expenses for medical 
bills, and diminished earning capacity.  A. 4-5.  At the time of 
                                              
1 On appeal from the grant of a motion to dismiss, the factual 
allegations set forth below are derived from Alpizar-Fallas’s 
complaint and are accepted as true.  See Bridge v. Phoenix 
Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 642 n.1 (2008). 
Case: 17-3837     Document: 003113086823     Page: 3      Date Filed: 11/15/2018
4 
 
the accident, both Alpizar-Fallas and Favero were insured by 
Progressive. 
 
The morning following the accident, Barbosa, a 
Progressive claims adjuster, contacted Alpizar-Fallas by 
phone.  He represented that he was a Progressive agent and 
asked if he could come to her home to inspect the damage to 
her car and have her sign “paperwork” that would “expedite 
the processing of the property damage claim.”  A. 2, 6.  
Barbosa arrived about an hour later with multiple documents 
for Alpizar-Fallas to sign.  She alleged in her complaint that 
he told her that her accident “had a questionable issue of 
liability” and that her signature was “necessary” for 
Progressive to advance the payment of her claim.  A. 6.  
Barbosa presented a document to Alpizar-Fallas that he 
“required” her to sign and that he “expressly represented 
would expedite the property damage claim of the accident.”  
Id.  In reliance on Barbosa’s statements, Alpizar-Fallas signed 
the document. 
 
Contrary to Barbosa’s assertions, the document was, in 
fact, “a broadly written comprehensive general release of any 
and all claims,” including claims against Favero for “any and 
all known and unknown personal injuries resulting from the 
motor vehicle accident.”  A. 7.  Alpizar-Fallas was unaware 
of the legal significance of the release language in the 
document, and Barbosa failed to alert her to it.  Barbosa also 
failed to advise Alpizar-Fallas to seek legal counsel and did 
not communicate with her in Spanish, her native language.  
Furthermore, he required that Alpizar-Fallas “sign the release 
in his presence at her home.”  Id. 
 
 




Alpizar-Fallas commenced this action in New Jersey 
state court against Favero, 2 seeking damages for the personal 
injuries she sustained in the accident.  She amended her 
complaint to include a class action claim against Progressive 
and Barbosa under the New Jersey Unfair Claims Settlement 
Practices Regulations (“UCSPR”), N.J. Admin. Code §§ 
11:2-17.1 to -17.15, and the CFA, N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 56:8-1 to 
-210.  Alpizar-Fallas again amended her complaint to name 
the proper insurance carrier, and the defendants removed the 
case to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. 
 
Once in federal court, Progressive and Barbosa 
(collectively, “Appellees”) moved to dismiss Alpizar-Fallas’s 
class action claim for failure to state a claim.  They lodged 
several arguments: the UCSPR does not provide a private 
right of action, the UCSPR precludes application of the CFA, 
the CFA does not apply to schemes to defraud policyholders 
of their benefits and personal injury claims, and Alpizar-
Fallas failed to properly plead a claim for relief under the 
CFA.  Specifically, with respect to their final argument, 
Appellees contended that Alpizar-Fallas did not meet the 
heightened pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 9(b), did not plead an “ascertainable loss” as 
required by the CFA, and did not allege a violation of the 
CFA because Appellees were acting pursuant to Favero’s 
insurance policy, not her policy, when Barbosa visited 
Alpizar-Fallas’s residence. 
                                              
2 She also named “John Doe 1-5” and “John Doe 
Incorporated 1-5” as defendants, alleging that they may have 
caused the accident.  A. 2, 4. 





The District Court granted Appellees’ motion without 
prejudice in an order and letter opinion.  The District Court 
first dismissed Alpizar-Fallas’s class action claim to the 
extent it alleged a violation of the UCSPR because that set of 
regulations does not provide a private right of action.  Next, 
the District Court dismissed Alpizar-Fallas’s CFA claim, 
construing the CFA to only apply to the “sale or marketing” 
of insurance policies.  A. 40.  Although the District Court 
referred to our opinion in Weiss v. First Unum Life Insurance 
Co., 482 F.3d 254, 266 (3d Cir. 2007), in which we held that 
the CFA covers the performance of insurance policies, the 
District Court opted to follow a more recent decision of the 
New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division, Myska v. N.J. 
Manufacturers Insurance Co., 114 A.3d 761 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2015).  Quoting Myska, the District Court noted 
that the CFA does not apply to “an insurance company’s 
refusal to pay benefits.”  A. 40 (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted) (emphasis added).  The District Court viewed 
the facts of Alpizar-Fallas’s case as similar to those in Myska, 
where the plaintiff attacked an insurance company’s 
“systematic practice of denying, obfuscating coverage of, or 
otherwise avoiding claims by New Jersey consumers.”  Id. 
(quoting Myska, 114 A.3d at 767) (emphasis in original) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The District Court also 
noted that the Myska court “distinguished Weiss as involving 
the ‘fraudulent discontinuation of previously authorized 
benefits.’”  A. 41 (quoting Myska, 114 A.3d at 777). 
Thereafter, the District Court, upon Alpizar-Fallas’s 
motion and the agreement of the other parties, entered a 
consent order, amending its dismissal to one with prejudice 
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and remanding the remaining personal injury claims to New 
Jersey state court.  Alpizar-Fallas filed this timely appeal. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1332(d) and 1453.  This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a district court’s 
dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) de 
novo, In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 868 F.3d 231, 249 (3d Cir. 
2017), and “must consider only the complaint, exhibits 
attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as 
undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant’s claims 
are based upon these documents,” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 
F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010).  We accept all factual 
allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable 
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.  West Penn Allegheny 
Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 91 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 
III. 
On appeal, Alpizar-Fallas contends that the District 
Court erred in dismissing her CFA claim because the 
allegations of her complaint set forth the type of harm that the 
CFA is designed to remedy.3  In opposition, Appellees argue 
that her CFA claim is precluded by the UCSPR, that her 
allegations are not within the scope of the CFA, and that her 
pleading fails to conform to the requirements of the CFA and 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). 
 
                                              
3 She does not appeal the District Court’s dismissal of her 
UCSPA claim. 




In determining the extent to which the CFA applies to 
the performance of insurance contracts, we must predict how 
the New Jersey Supreme Court would rule if faced with the 
issue.  Covington v. Continental Gen. Tire, Inc., 381 F.3d 
216, 218 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).  In doing so, we 
must consider: 
 
decisions of state intermediate 
appellate courts, of federal courts 
interpreting that state’s law, and 
of other state supreme courts that 
have addressed the issue, as well 
as to analogous decisions, 
considered dicta, scholarly works, 
and any other reliable data 
tending convincingly to show how 
the highest court in the state 
would decide the issue at hand. 
Spence v. ESAB Grp., Inc., 623 F.3d 212, 216-17 (3d Cir. 
2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
Intermediate state court decisions are relevant and should not 
be disregarded unless we are “convinced by other persuasive 
data that the highest court of the state would decide 




In relevant part, the CFA prohibits: 
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[t]he act, use or employment by 
any person of any unconscionable 
commercial practice, deception, 
fraud, false pretense, false 
promise, misrepresentation, or the 
knowing, concealment, 
suppression, or omission of any 
material fact with intent that 
others rely upon such 
concealment, suppression or 
omission, in connection with the 
sale or advertisement of any 
merchandise or real estate, or with 
the subsequent performance of 
such person as aforesaid, whether 
or not any person has in fact been 
misled, deceived or damaged 
thereby . . . . 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-2 (emphasis added).  This provision 
may be enforced by individual consumers, who may be 
compensated for violations with treble damages.  Id. §§ 56:8-
2.11 to -2.12, 56:8-19.  Additionally, the CFA’s “rights, 
remedies and prohibitions” are explicitly cumulative to those 
created by other sources of law.  Id. § 56:8-2.13. 
 
The CFA is intended to “combat the increasingly 
widespread practice of defrauding the consumer.”  Cox v. 
Sears Roebuck & Co., 647 A.2d 454, 460 (N.J. 1994) 
(quoting S. Comm., Statement to the Senate Bill No. 199 
(N.J. 1960)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  In enacting 
the CFA, the New Jersey Legislature intended to “give New 
Jersey one of the strongest consumer protection laws in the 
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nation.”  Id. (citing Governor’s Press Release for Assembly 
Bill No. 2402, at 1 (Apr. 19, 1971)).  Therefore, its history “is 
one of constant expansion of consumer protection,” Gennari 
v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 691 A.2d 350, 364 (N.J. 1997), and 
it “should be construed liberally in favor of consumers,” Cox, 
647 A.2d at 461. 
2. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court addressed whether the 
sale of insurance is covered by the CFA in Lemelledo v. 
Beneficial Management Corp., 696 A.2d 546 (N.J. 1997).  
There, the court was faced with the application of the CFA to 
an insurance-related lending practice, namely, “loan 
packing,” or “increasing the principal amount of a loan by 
combining the loan with loan-related services, such as credit 
insurance, that the borrower does not want.”  Id. at 548.  The 
plaintiff alleged that the defendant, a financial services 
company, led her to believe that she would not receive her 
loan unless she also purchased other loan-related services 
with it.  She maintained this claim despite the fact that the 
defendant provided a disclosure statement informing her that 
she was not required to purchase the services.  Id. at 549.  
Although the CFA does not explicitly name insurance 
policies as covered “merchandise,” the court held that “the 
statute’s language is ample enough to encompass the sale of 
insurance policies as goods and services that are marketed to 
consumers.”  Id. at 551 (emphasis added).  In so holding, the 
court noted that “several lower courts have held that the 
payment of insurance benefits is not subject to the CFA,” but 
since the issue was not squarely presented, declined to rule on 
it.  Id. (citing Nikiper v. Motor Club of Am. Cos., 557 A.2d 
332, 336 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1989), certif. denied, 564 
A.2d 863 (N.J. 1989); Pierzga v. Ohio Cas. Grp. of Ins. Cos., 
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504 A.2d 1200, 1205 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986), certif. 
denied, 517 A.2d 402 (N.J. 1986)); id. at 551 n.3. 
 
In extending the CFA to the sale of insurance, the 
Lemelledo court endorsed a broad application of the statute:  
“The language of the CFA evinces a clear legislative intent 
that its provisions be applied broadly in order to accomplish 
its remedial purpose, namely, to root out consumer fraud.”  
Id. at 551.  Even though insurance was not named in the 
statute, the court reasoned that the CFA “could not possibly 
enumerate all, or even most, of the areas and practices that it 
covers without severely retarding its broad remedial power to 
root out fraud in its myriad, nefarious manifestations.”  Id. 
 
The court also addressed whether application of the 
CFA to the sale of insurance “would run counter to our 
traditional reluctance to impose potentially inconsistent 
administrative obligations on regulated parties.”  Id. at 552.  
In holding that application of the CFA was not precluded by 
four other insurance-related statutes—the Consumer Loan 
Act, the New Jersey Insurance Trade Practices Act (“ITPA”), 
the Insurance Producer Licensing Act, and the Credit Life and 
Health Insurance Act—the court noted “the strong and 
sweeping legislative remedial purpose apparent in the CFA” 
and found that the CFA’s cumulative remedies and private 
right of action provisions “reflect an apparent legislative 
intent to enlarge fraud-fighting authority and to delegate that 
authority among various governmental and nongovernmental 
entities . . . .”  Id. at 553-55.  Because all of the reviewed 
statutes have the same goal, “namely, the prevention of fraud 
and misrepresentation in the sale of credit and/or insurance,” 
the CFA “simply complements” the others.  Id. at 555. 
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We were guided by Lemelledo’s holding in Weiss v. 
First Unum Life Insurance Co., where we addressed whether 
the CFA covered the allegedly fraudulent practice of 
discontinuing previously authorized benefit payments.  482 
F.3d at 256, 265.  In responding in the affirmative, we 
predicted that the New Jersey Supreme Court would hold that 
the CFA covers “fraud both in the initial sale (where the seller 
never intends to pay), and fraud in the subsequent 
performance (where the seller at some point elects not to 
fulfill its obligations).”  Id. at 266 (emphasis added).  In doing 
so, we highlighted the language of the statute, which 
explicitly covers acts “in connection with . . . the subsequent 
performance of such person as aforesaid,” and Lemelledo’s 
“sweeping statements regarding the application of the CFA to 
deter and punish deceptive insurance practices.”  Id. 
(quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 
3. 
Appellees contend that the UCSPR precludes 
application of the CFA in this case.  Specifically, Appellees 
argue that the ITPA, the statute pursuant to which the UCSPR 
regulations were promulgated, creates a “direct and 
unavoidable conflict” with the CFA because the former does 
not offer a private right of action while the latter does.  Br. for 
Appellees at 14 (quoting Lemelledo, 696 A.2d. at 554).  As 
noted above, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
directly addressed any potential conflict between the CFA 
and the ITPA in Lemelledo and held that none exists.  696 
A.2d at 555 (noting that the ITPA’s remedies are explicitly 
cumulative). 
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Moreover, the fact that a private right of action exists 
under the CFA but not the ITPA does not create a “direct and 
unavoidable conflict” that would preclude application of the 
CFA here.  The Lemelledo court established a presumption 
that the CFA applies in the face of potential conflicts.  Id. at 
553-54.  This presumption can only be rebutted by “a direct 
and unavoidable conflict” between the CFA and other 
regulatory schemes.  Id. at 554.  In determining whether such 
a conflict exists, a court should consider whether the other 
regulation or regulations “deal specifically, concretely, and 
pervasively with the particular activity, implying a legislative 
intent not to subject parties to multiple regulations that, as 
applied, will work at cross-purposes.”  Id.  Furthermore, “the 
conflict must be patent and sharp, and must not simply 
constitute a mere possibility of incompatibility.”  Id.  For 
example, in Daaleman v. Elizabethtown Gas Co., 390 A.2d 
566 (N.J. 1978), the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected 
application of the CFA to the rate-setting of a privately 
owned public utility, reasoning that “application of the CFA . 
. . could . . . lead to the anomalous result of a tariff approved 
by the [Public Utilities Commission] but rejected and 
penalized by the Division of Consumer Affairs or the courts 
applying the CFA.”  Lemelledo, 482 F.3d at 553. 
 
The allowance of a private right of action in 
conjunction with regulatory action does not amount to “a 
direct and unavoidable conflict” reproved by Lemelledo.  
First, the New Jersey Supreme Court has explicitly authorized 
multiple remedies of these types, stating that the allowance of 
a cause of action for damages in one statute does not 
“inhibit[] enforcement of . . . other statutes, because a court 
can assess damages in addition to any other penalty to which 
a defendant is subject.”  Id. at 555.  Second, regulation by the 
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New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance under the 
UCSPR would not be inconsistent with Alpizar-Fallas’s CFA 
claim to the same extent as the potential conflict with utility 
rate-setting in Daaleman, since, in this case, both would 
potentially punish unlawful behavior and neither would 
affirmatively approve the same conduct.  Finally, the 
remedies of both the CFA and the ITPA are explicitly 
cumulative, which “reflect[s] an apparent legislative intent to 
enlarge fraud-fighting authority and to delegate that authority 
among various governmental and nongovernmental entities, 
each exercising different forms of remedial power.”  Id. at 
553.  For these reasons, we reject Appellees’ argument that 
application of the CFA to this case is precluded by the 
UCSPR. 
4. 
Appellees rely, as did the District Court, on Myska for 
the proposition that the denial of benefits is outside the scope 
of the CFA.  See Myska v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 114 A.3d 761, 
777 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015).  In Myska, the 
defendant insurance company had denied the plaintiffs’ 
claims for payment for diminution of value of their cars after 
they had been damaged in accidents.  Id. at 765-67.  In 
finding the plaintiffs’ allegations outside the scope of the 
CFA, the court reasoned that the CFA “was not intended as a 
vehicle to recover damages for an insurance company’s 
refusal to pay benefits.”  Id. at 777.  Because “the essence of 
plaintiffs’ causes of action involved whether they filed and 
supported a claim for a specified amount of benefits under 
their respective policies,” their claims were not cognizable 
under the CFA.  Id. 
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That case is inapposite.  Here, Alpizar-Fallas alleges 
neither that she filed an insurance claim nor that she was 
denied any benefits.  Instead, the allegations in her complaint 
fall squarely within the language of the CFA and our holding 
in Weiss.  Specifically, she alleges the following:  
 
 Alpizar-Fallas “relied on the express false 
representations of the agent and/or employee of her 
insurance company’s claims adjuster—Defendant 
Barbosa—that the documents he prepared and 
delivered to her needed to be signed merely to 
facilitate her receipt of the money for the damages to 
her motor vehicle;” 
 
 Barbosa “falsely represented the nature of the 
documents that [she] signed;” 
 
 “The document, prepared by the [Appellees,] was in 
fact a broadly written comprehensive general release 
of any and all claims;” 
 
 “Plaintiff reasonably relied on the materially false 
representations of [Appellees] when she signed the 
documents since Defendant Barbosa, [sic] represented 
to [Alpizar-Fallas] that he was an agent of [her] own 
insurance company, Progressive;”  
 
 
 “[Appellees] and others at the insurance company have 
engaged in this same pattern of unlawful conduct with 
respect to other similarly situated individuals;” and  
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 “As a result of this deceptive and unconscionable 
practice, present and former insurance policy holders 
of Defendant, Progressive[,] have continued to be 
stripped of their rights to pursue claims against other 
policy holders of Progressive Garden State Insurance 
Company due to the [Appellees’] false and misleading 
representations . . . .”  A. 7-8. 
 
 
These facts, taken together, amount to an allegation of fraud 
in connection with the subsequent performance of a consumer 
contract, a situation explicitly covered by the language of the 
CFA, sanctioned by this Court in Weiss, and supported by the 
New Jersey Supreme Court’s broad statements regarding the 
application of the CFA.4 
                                              
4 Appellees also contend that because Barbosa was acting 
pursuant to Favero’s policy when he met with Alpizar-Fallas 
in her home, Alpizar-Fallas is not a consumer protected by 
the CFA for purposes of this interaction.  Because Appellees 
failed to argue this before the District Court, this argument is 
waived.  Gass v. Virgin Islands Tel. Corp., 311 F.3d 237, 246 
(3d Cir. 2002).  Even if not waived, Appellees’ contentions 
are not supported by Alpizar-Fallas’s complaint, which is the 
only document we can consider on this motion to dismiss.  
See Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010).  
Instead, Alpizar-Fallas alleged that “Barbosa[] represented to 
Plaintiff . . . that he was an agent of Plaintiff’s insurance 
company Progressive, and that he was in the neighborhood 
and that Plaintiff’s insurance company wanted him to visit the 
Plaintiff . . . ,” and that she “relied on the materially false 
representations of [Barbosa] when she signed the documents 
since [he] represented to the Plaintiff that he was an agent of 
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In sum, we predict that the New Jersey Supreme Court 
would apply the CFA to Alpizar-Fallas’s claim, where an 
insurance company is alleged to have fraudulently performed 
a contract with a consumer.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
Alpizar-Fallas stated a viable claim under the CFA. 
 
B. 
Finally, Appellees argue that Alpizar-Fallas’s 
complaint does not conform to the heightened pleading 
requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) and does 
not allege an “ascertainable loss” as required by the CFA.  
We reject both of these arguments. 
 
1. 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires that “[i]n 
alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity 
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”  This has 
been interpreted to require that plaintiffs “state the 
circumstances of the alleged fraud with sufficient particularity 
to place the defendant on notice of the ‘precise misconduct 
with which [it is] charged’” and “plead or allege the date, 
time and place of the alleged fraud or otherwise inject 
precision or some measure of substantiation into a fraud 
allegation.”  Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 200 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).  In her 
complaint, Alpizar-Fallas alleged the precise events 
                                                                                                     
the Plaintiff’s own insurance company, Progressive.” A. 6-7 
(emphasis added).  Therefore, Alpizar-Fallas has alleged 
fraud in conjunction with the performance of her own 
insurance policy. 
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surrounding her CFA claim.  She pled the date, time, and 
place of Appellees’ conduct and provided a detailed 
description of that conduct.  Therefore, her allegations meet 
Rule 9(b)’s standard. 
 
2. 
The CFA requires a plaintiff to allege “ascertainable 
loss.”  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-19; D’Agostino v. 
Maldonado, 78 A.3d 527, 536-37 (N.J. 2013).  The New 
Jersey Supreme Court has defined “ascertainable loss” as 
“either an out-of-pocket loss or a demonstration of loss in 
value that is quantifiable or measureable.”  Marcus v. BMW 
of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 606 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting 
Thiedemann v. Mercedes-Benz U.S.A., LLC, 872 A.2d 783, 
792-93 (N.J. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Furthermore, that court has held that such a loss “need not yet 
have been experienced as an out-of-pocket loss to the 
plaintiff.”  Thiedemann, 872 A.2d at 793.  The New Jersey 
Superior Court Appellate Division has stated that a plaintiff is 
not required to allege the nature of the loss or present 
evidence of it at the motion to dismiss stage.  Perkins v. 
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 890 A.2d 997, 1003-04 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2006). 
 
In Alpizar-Fallas’s complaint, she alleged that, 
because of Appellees’ conduct, she and other class members 
were “stripped of their rights to pursue claims against other 
policy holders of Progressive . . . .”  A. 8 (emphasis added).  
In Alpizar-Fallas’s case, this means that she is unable to 
recover certain losses from her accident with Favero, which 
are detailed in the beginning of her complaint.  Specifically, 
she has required and will continue to require medical care; 
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has suffered “impairment of her earning capacity and power;” 
has suffered and will continue to suffer “great pain, suffering 
agony, mental anguish, embarrassment and humiliation;” has 
been hindered and will be hindered “from attending to her 
daily duties, functions and occupation;” and will “continue to 
incur other financial losses or expenses.”  A. 4-5.  These 
allegations are sufficient to demonstrate a “loss in value that 
is quantifiable or measureable .”5 
 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s dismissal and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
                                              
5 Appellees also argue that there were “no damages at all” 
because Alpizar-Fallas “was paid for her claim against 
Favero.”  Br. of Appellees at 19.  Because this was not 
alleged in the complaint, we will not consider it at the motion 
to dismiss stage.  See Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 
(3d Cir. 2010). 
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